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Abstract
Depending on how much information an adversary can access to, adversarial attacks can be
classified as white-box attack and black-box attack. For white-box attack, optimization-based
attack algorithms such as projected gradient descent (PGD) can achieve relatively high attack
success rates within moderate iterates. However, they tend to generate adversarial examples
near or upon the boundary of the perturbation set, resulting in large distortion. Furthermore,
their corresponding black-box attack algorithms also suffer from high query complexities, thereby
limiting their practical usefulness. In this paper, we focus on the problem of developing efficient
and effective optimization-based adversarial attack algorithms. In particular, we propose a novel
adversarial attack framework for both white-box and black-box settings based on a variant of
Frank-Wolfe algorithm. We show in theory that the proposed attack algorithms are efficient with
an O(1/
√
T ) convergence rate. The empirical results of attacking the ImageNet and MNIST
datasets also verify the efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed algorithms. More specifically,
our proposed algorithms attain the best attack performances in both white-box and black-box
attacks among all baselines, and are more time and query efficient than the state-of-the-art.
1 Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have made many breakthroughs in different areas of artificial
intelligence such as image classification (Krizhevsky et al., 2012; He et al., 2016), object detection
(Ren et al., 2015; Girshick, 2015), and speech recognition (Mohamed et al., 2012; Bahdanau et al.,
2016). However, recent studies show that deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial
examples (Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2015) – a tiny perturbation on an image that is
almost invisible to human eyes could mislead a well-trained image classifier towards misclassification.
Soon later this is proved to be not a coincidence in image classification: similar phenomena have
been observed in other problems such as speech recognition (Carlini et al., 2016), visual QA (Xu
et al., 2017), image captioning (Chen et al., 2017a), machine translation (Cheng et al., 2018),
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reinforcement learning (Pattanaik et al., 2018), and even on systems that operate in the physical
world (Kurakin et al., 2016).
Depending on how much information an adversary can access to, adversarial attacks can be
classified into two classes: white-box attack (Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2015) and
black-box attack (Papernot et al., 2016a; Chen et al., 2017c). In the white-box setting, the adversary
has full access to the target model, while in the black-box setting, the adversary can only access the
input and output of the target model but not its internal configurations.
Several optimization-based methods have been proposed for the white-box attack. One of the
first successful attempt is the FGSM method (Goodfellow et al., 2015), which works by linearizing
the network loss function. CW method (Carlini and Wagner, 2017) further improves the attack
effectiveness by designing a regularized loss function based on the logit-layer output of the network
and optimizing the loss by Adam (Kingma and Ba, 2015). Even though CW largely improves the
effectiveness, it requires a large number of gradient iterations to optimize the distortion of the
adversarial examples. Iterative gradient (steepest) descent based methods such as PGD (Madry
et al., 2018) and I-FGSM (Kurakin et al., 2016) can achieve relatively high attack success rates
within a moderate number of iterations. However, they tend to generate adversarial examples near
or upon the boundary of the perturbation set, due to the projection nature of the algorithm. This
leads to large distortion in the resulting adversarial examples.
In the black-box attack, since one needs to make gradient estimations in such setting, a large
number of queries are required to perform a successful black-box attack, especially when the
data dimension is high. A naive way to estimate gradient direction is to perform finite difference
approximation on each dimension (Chen et al., 2017c). This would take O(d) queries to performance
one full gradient estimation where d is the data dimension and therefore result in inefficient attacks.
For example, attacking a 299× 299× 3 ImageNet (Deng et al., 2009) image may take hundreds of
thousands of queries. This significantly limits the practical usefulness of such algorithms since they
can be easily defeated by limiting the number of queries that an adversary can make to the target
model. Although recent studies (Ilyas et al., 2018a,b) have improved the query complexity by using
Gaussian sensing vectors or gradient priors, due to the inefficiencies of PGD framework, there is
still room for improvements.
In this paper, we propose efficient and effective optimization-based adversarial attack algorithms
based on a variant of Frank-Wolfe algorithm. We show in theory that the proposed attack algorithms
are efficient with guaranteed convergence rate. The empirical results also verify the efficiency and
effectiveness of our proposed algorithms.
In summary, we make the following main contributions:
1. We develop a new Frank-Wolfe based projection-free attack framework with momentum
mechanism. The framework contains an iterative first-order white-box attack algorithm
which admits the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) as a one-step special case, and also a
corresponding black-box attack algorithm which adopts zeroth-order optimization with two
sensing vector options (either from the Euclidean unit sphere or from the standard Gaussian
distribution).
2. We prove that the proposed white-box and black-box attack algorithms with momentum
mechanism enjoy an O(1/
√
T ) convergence rate in the nonconvex setting. We also show that
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the query complexity of the proposed black-box attack algorithm is linear in data dimension d.
3. Our experiments on MNIST and ImageNet datasets show that (i) the proposed white-box
attack algorithm has better distortion and is more efficient than all the state-of-the-art white-
box attack baseline algorithms, and (ii) the proposed black-box attack algorithm is highly
query efficient and achieves the highest attack success rate among other baselines.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we briefly review existing
literature on adversarial examples and Frank-Wolfe algorithm. We present our proposed Frank-Wolfe
framework in Section 3, and the main theory in Section 4. In Section 5, we compare the proposed
algorithms with state-of-the-art adversarial attack algorithms on ImageNet and MNIST datasets.
Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 6.
2 Related Work
There is a large body of work on adversarial attacks. In this section, we review the most relevant
work in both white-box and black-box attack settings, as well as the non-convex Frank-Wolfe
optimization.
White-box Attacks: Szegedy et al. (2013) proposed to use box-constrained L-BFGS algorithm
for conducting white-box attacks. Goodfellow et al. (2015) proposed the Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) based on linearization of the network as a simple alternative to L-BFGS. Kurakin et al.
(2016) proposed to iteratively perform one-step FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2015) algorithm and clips
the adversarial point back to the distortion limit after every iteration. It is called Basic Iterative
Method (BIM) or I-FGM in the literature. Madry et al. (2018) showed that for the L∞ norm case,
BIM/I-FGM is almost1 equivalent to Projected Gradient Descent (PGD), which is a standard tool
for constrained optimization. Papernot et al. (2016b) proposed JSMA to greedily attack the most
significant pixel based on the Jacobian-based saliency map. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (2016) proposed
attack methods by projecting the data to the closest separating hyperplane. Carlini and Wagner
(2017) introduced the so-called CW attack by proposing multiple new loss functions for generating
adversarial examples. Chen et al. (2017b) followed CW’s framework and use an Elastic Net term as
the distortion penalty. Dong et al. (2018) proposed MI-FGSM to boost the attack performances
using momentum.
Black-box Attacks: One popular family of black-box attacks (Hu and Tan, 2017; Papernot et al.,
2016a, 2017) is based on the transferability of adversarial examples (Liu et al., 2018; Bhagoji et al.,
2017), where an adversarial example generated for one DNN may be reused to attack other neural
networks. This allows the adversary to construct a substitute model that mimics the targeted DNN,
and then attack the constructed substitute model using white-box attack methods. However, this
type of attack algorithms usually suffer from large distortions and relatively low success rates (Chen
et al., 2017c). To address this issue, Chen et al. (2017c) proposed the Zeroth-Order Optimization
(ZOO) algorithm that extends the CW attack to the black-box setting and uses a zeroth-order
optimization approach to conduct the attack. Although ZOO achieves much higher attack success
rates than the substitute model-based black-box attacks, it suffers from a poor query complexity
1Standard PGD in the optimization literature uses the exact gradient to perform the update step while PGD
(Madry et al., 2018) is actually the steepest descent Boyd and Vandenberghe (2004) with respect to L∞ norm.
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since its naive implementation requires to estimate the gradients of all the coordinates (pixels) of
the image. To improve its query complexity, several approaches have been proposed. For example,
Tu et al. (2018) introduces an adaptive random gradient estimation algorithm and a well-trained
Autoencoder to speed up the attack process. Ilyas et al. (2018a) and Liu et al. (2018) improved
ZOO’s query complexity by using Natural Evolutionary Strategies (NES) (Wierstra et al., 2014;
Salimans et al., 2017) and active learning, respectively. Ilyas et al. (2018b) further improve the
performance by considering the gradient priors.
Non-convex Frank-Wolfe Algorithms: The Frank-Wolfe algorithm (Frank and Wolfe, 1956),
also known as the conditional gradient method, is an iterative optimization method for constrained
optimization problem. Jaggi (2013) revisited Frank-Wolfe algorithm in 2013 and provided a
stronger and more general convergence analysis in the convex setting. Yu et al. (2017) proved the
first convergence rate for Frank-Wolfe type algorithm in the non-convex setting. Lacoste-Julien
(2016) provided the convergence guarantee for Frank-Wolfe algorithm in the non-convex setting
with adaptive step sizes. Reddi et al. (2016) further studied the convergence rate of non-convex
stochastic Frank-Wolfe algorithm in the finite-sum optimization setting. Very recently, Staib and
Jegelka (2017) proposed to use Frank-Wolfe for distributionally robust training (Sinha et al., 2018).
Balasubramanian and Ghadimi (2018) proved the convergence rate for zeroth-order nonconvex
Frank-Wolfe algorithm using one-side finite difference gradient estimator with standard Gaussian
sensing vectors.
3 Methodology
3.1 Notation
Throughout the paper, scalars are denoted by lower case letters, vectors by lower case bold face
letters and sets by calligraphy upper cae letters. For a vector x ∈ Rd, we denote the Lp norm of
x by ‖x‖p = (
∑d
i=1 x
p
i )
1/p. Specially, for p = ∞, the L∞ norm of x by ‖x‖∞ = maxdi=1 |θi|. We
denote PX (x) as the projection operation of projecting vector x into the set X .
3.2 Problem Formulation
According to the attack purposes, attacks can be divided into two categories: untargeted attack and
targeted attack.
In particular, untargeted attack aims to turn the prediction into any incorrect label, while the
targeted attack, requires to mislead the classifier to a specific target class. In this work, we focus
on the strictly harder targeted attack setting (Carlini and Wagner, 2017; Ilyas et al., 2018a). It is
worth noting that our proposed algorithm can be extended to untargeted attack straightforwardly.
To be more specific, let us define `(x, y) as the classification loss function of the targeted DNN with
an input x ∈ Rd and a corresponding label y. For targeted attacks, we aim to minimize `(x, ytar) to
learn an adversarial example that will be misclassified to the target class ytar. In the rest of this
paper, let f(x) = `(x, ytar) be the attack loss function for simplicity, and the corresponding targeted
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attack problem2 can be formulated as the following optimization problem:
minx f(x)
subject to ‖x− xori‖p ≤ . (3.1)
Evidently, the constraint set X := {x | ‖x− xori‖p ≤ } is a bounded convex set when p ≥ 1. Note
that even though we mainly focus on the most popular L∞ attack case in this paper, our proposed
methods can easily extend to general p ≥ 1 case.
3.3 Frank-Wolfe vs. PGD
Although PGD can achieve relatively high attack success rate within moderate iterates, the multi-
step update formula requires an additional projection step at each iteration to keep the iterates
within the constraint set. This tends to cause the generated adversarial examples near or upon
the boundary of the constraint set, and leads to relatively large distortion. This motivates us
to use Frank-Wolfe based optimization algorithm Frank and Wolfe (1956). Different from PGD,
Frank-Wolfe algorithm is projection-free as it calls a Linear Minimization Oracle (LMO) over the
constraint set X at each iteration, i.e.,
LMO ∈ argmin
x∈X
〈x,∇f(xt)〉.
The LMO can be seen as the minimization of the first-order Taylor expansion of f(·) at point xt:
min
x∈X
f(xt) + 〈x− xt,∇f(xt)〉.
By calling LMO, Frank Wolfe solves the linear problem in X and then perform weighted average
with previous iterate to obtain the final update formula.
Comparing the two methods, PGD is a more “aggressive” approach. It first takes a step towards
the negative gradient direction while ignoring the constraint to get a new point (often outside the
constraint set), and then correct the new point by projecting it back into the constraint set. In sharp
contrast, Frank-Wolfe is more “conservative” as it always keeps the iterates within the constraint
set. Therefore, it avoids projection and can lead to better distortion.
3.4 Frank-Wolfe White-box Attacks
The proposed Frank-Wolfe based white-box attack algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1, which is
built upon the classic Frank-Wolfe algorithm. The key difference between Algorithm 1 and the
classic Frank-Wolfe algorithm is in Line 4, where an additional momentum term mt is introduced.
The momentum term mt will help stabilize the LMO direction and leads to empirically accelerated
convergence of Algorithm 1.
The LMO solution itself can be expensive to obtain in general. Fortunately, for the constraint
set X defined in (3.1), the corresponding LMO has a closed-form solution. Here we provide the
2Note that there is usually an additional constraint on the input variable x, e.g., x ∈ [0, 1]n for normalized image
inputs.
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Algorithm 1 Frank-Wolfe White-box Attack Algorithm
1: input: number of iterations T , step sizes {γt};
2: x0 = xori,m−1 = ∇f(x0)
3: for t = 0, . . . , T − 1 do
4: mt = β ·mt−1 + (1− β) · ∇f(xt)
5: vt = argminx∈X 〈x,mt〉 // LMO
6: dt = vt − xt
7: xt+1 = xt + γtdt
8: end for
9: output: xT
closed-form solution of LMO (Line 5 in Algorithm 1) for L∞ norm case3:
vt = − · sign(mt) + xori.
Note that if we write down the full update formula at each iteration in Algorithm 1, it becomes
xt+1 = xt − γt · sign(mt)− γt(xt − xori). (3.2)
Intuitively speaking, the term −γt(xt − xori) enforces xt to be close to xori for all t = 1, . . . , T ,
which encourages the adversarial example to have a small distortion. This is the key advantage of
Algorithm 1.
Comparison with FGSM: When T = 1, substituting the above LMO solutions into Algorithm
1 yields the final update of x1 = x0 − γt · sign(∇f(x0)), which reduces to FGSM4 when γt = 1.
Therefore, our proposed Frank-Wolfe white-box attack also includes FGSM as a one-step special
instance.
3.5 Frank-Wolfe Black-box Attacks
Next we consider the black-box setting, where we cannot perform back-propagation to calculate the
gradient of the loss function anymore. Instead, we can only query the DNN system’s outputs with
specific inputs. To clarify, here the output refers to the logit layer’s output (confidence scores for
classification), not the final prediction label.
We propose a zeroth-order Frank-Wolfe based algorithm to solve this problem in Algorithm
2. The key difference between our proposed black-box attack and white-box attack is one extra
gradient estimation step, which is presented in Line 4 in Algorithm 2. Also, the momentum term mt
is now defined as the exponential average of previous gradient estimations {qt}T−1t=0 . This will help
reduce the variance in zeroth-order gradient estimation and empirically accelerate the convergence
of Algorithm 2.
As in many other zeroth-order optimization algorithms (Shamir, 2017; Flaxman et al., 2005),
Algorithm 3 uses symmetric finite differences to estimate the gradient and therefore, gets rid of the
3The derivation can be found in the Appendix A.
4The extra clipping operation in FGSM is to project to the additional box constraint for image classification task.
We will also need this clipping operation at the end of each iteration for specific tasks such as image classification.
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Algorithm 2 Frank-Wolfe Black-box Attack Algorithm
1: input: number of iterations T , step sizes {γt}, sample size for gradient estimation b, sampling
parameter δ;
2: x0 = xori, m−1 = GRAD EST(x0, b, δ)
3: for t = 0, . . . , T − 1 do
4: qt = GRAD EST(xt, b, δ) // Alg 3
5: mt = β ·mt−1 + (1− β) · qt
6: vt = argminv∈X 〈v,mt〉
7: dt = vt − xt
8: xt+1 = xt + γtdt
9: end for
10: output: xT
dependence on back-propagation in white-box setting. Different from Chen et al. (2017c), here we
do not utilize natural basis as our sensing vectors, instead, we provide two options: one is to use
vectors uniformly sampled from Euclidean unit sphere and the other is to use vectors uniformly
sampled from standard multivarite Gaussian distribution. This will greatly improve the gradient
estimation efficiency comparing to sensing with natural basis as such option will only be able to
estimate one coordinate of the gradient vector per query. In practice, both options here provide us
competitive experimental results. It is worth noting that NES method (Wierstra et al., 2014) with
antithetic sampling (Salimans et al., 2017) used in Ilyas et al. (2018a) yields similar formula as our
option II in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 GRAD EST(x, b, δ)
1: q = 0
2: for i = 1, . . . , b do
3: option I: Sample ui uniformly from the Euclidean unit sphere with ‖ui‖2 = 1
q = q+ d2δb
(
f(x+ δui)− f(x− δui)
)
ui
4: option II: Sample ui uniformly from the standard Gaussian distribution N(0, I)
q = q+ 12δb
(
f(x+ δui)− f(x− δui)
)
ui
5: end for
6: return q
4 Main Theory
In this section, we establish the convergence guarantees for our proposed Frank-Wolfe adversarial
attack algorithms described in Section 3. The omitted proofs can be found in the Appendix B. First,
we introduce the convergence criterion for our Frank-Wolfe adversarial attack framework.
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4.1 Convergence Criterion
The loss function for common DNN models are generally nonconvex. In addition, (3.1) is a
constrained optimization. For such general nonconvex constrained optimization, we typically adopt
the Frank-Wolfe gap as the convergence criterion (since gradient norm of f is no longer a proper
criterion for constrained optimization problems):
g(xt) = max
x∈X
〈x− xt,−∇f(xt)〉.
Note that we always have g(xt) ≥ 0 and xt is a stationary point for the constrained optimization
problem if and only if g(xt) = 0, which makes g(xt) a perfect convergence criterion for Frank-Wolfe
based algorithms.
4.2 Convergence Guarantee for Frank-Wolfe White-box Attack
Before we are going to provide the convergence guarantee of Frank-Wolfe white-box attack (Algorithm
1), we introduce the following assumptions that are essential to the convergence analysis.
Assumption 4.1. Function f(·) is L-smooth with respect to x, i.e., for any x,x′, it holds that
f(x′) ≤ f(x) +∇f(x)>(x′ − x) + L
2
‖x′ − x‖22.
Assumption 4.1 is a standard assumption in nonconvex optimization, and is also adopted in other
Frank-Wolfe literature such as Lacoste-Julien (2016); Reddi et al. (2016). Note that even though
the smoothness assumption does not hold for general DNN models, a recent study (Santurkar et al.,
2018) shows that batch normalization that is used in many modern DNNs such as Inception V3
model, actually makes the optimization landscape significantly smoother5. This justifies the validity
of Assumption 4.1.
Assumption 4.2. Set X is bounded with diameter D, i.e., ‖x− x′‖2 ≤ D for all x,x′ ∈ X .
Assumption 4.2 implies that the input space is bounded. For common tasks such as image
classification, given the fact that images have bounded pixel range and  is a small constant, this
assumption trivially holds. Given the above assumptions, the following lemma shows that the
momentum term mt will not deviate from the gradient direction significantly.
Lemma 4.3. Under Assumptions 4.1 and 4.2, for mt in Algorithm 1, it holds that
‖∇f(xt)−mt‖2 ≤ γLD
1− β .
Now we present the theorem, which characterizes the convergence rate of our proposed Frank-
Wolfe white-box adversarial attack algorithm presented in Algorithm 1.
5The original argument in Santurkar et al. (2018) refers to the smoothness with respect to each layer’s parameters.
Note that the first layer’s parameters are in the mirror position (in terms of backpropagation) as the network inputs.
Therefore, the argument in Santurkar et al. (2018) can also be applied here with respect to the network inputs.
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Theorem 4.4. Under Assumptions 4.1 and 4.2, let γt = γ =
√
2(f(x0)− f(x∗))/(CβLD2T ), the
output of Algorithm 1 satisfies
g˜T ≤
√
2CβLD2(f(x0)− f(x∗))
T
,
where g˜T = min1≤k≤T g(xk), x∗ is the optimal solution to (3.1) and Cβ = (3− β)/(1− β).
Remark 4.5. Theorem 4.4 suggests that our proposed Frank-Wolfe white-box attack algorithm
achieves a O(1/
√
T ) rate of convergence. Unlike previous work (Lacoste-Julien, 2016) which focuses
on the convergence rate of classic Frank-Wolfe method, our analysis shows the convergence rate of
the Frank-Wolfe method with momentum mechanism.
4.3 Convergence Guarantee for Frank-Wolfe Black-box Attack
Next we analyze the convergence of our proposed Frank-Wolfe black-box adversarial attack algorithm
presented in Algorithm 2.
In order to prove the convergence of our proposed Frank-Wolfe black-box attack algorithm, we
need the following additional assumption that ‖∇f(0)‖2 is bounded.
Assumption 4.6. Gradient of f(·) at zero point ∇f(0) satisfies maxy ‖∇f(0)‖2 ≤ G.
Following the analysis in Shamir (2017), let fδ(x) = Eu[f(x + δu)], which is the smoothed
version of f(x). This smoothed function value plays a central role in our theoretical analysis, since it
bridges the finite difference gradient approximation with the actual gradient. The following lemma
shows this relationship.
Lemma 4.7. For any x and the gradient estimator q of ∇f(x) in Algorithm 3, its expectation and
variance satisfy
E[q] = ∇fδ(x),
E‖q− E[q]‖22 ≤
1
b
(
2d(G+ LD)2 +
1
2
δ2L2d2
)
.
And also we have
E‖∇f(x)− q‖2 ≤ δLd
2
+
2
√
d(G+ LD) + δLd√
2b
.
Now we are going to present the theorem, which characterizes the convergence rate of Algorithm
2.
Theorem 4.8. Under Assumptions 4.1, 4.2 and 4.6, let γt = γ =
√
(f(x0)− f(x∗))/(CβLD2T ),
b = Td and δ =
√
1/(Td2), the output of Algorithm 2 satisfies
E[g˜T ] ≤ D√
T
(
2
√
CβL(f(x0)− f(x∗)) + Cβ(L+G+ LD)
)
,
where g˜T = min1≤k≤T g(xk), the expectation of g˜T is over the randomness of the gradient estimator,
x∗ is the optimal solution to (3.1) and Cβ = (3− β)/(1− β).
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Remark 4.9. Theorem 4.8 suggests that Algorithm 2 also enjoys a O(1/
√
T ) rate of convergence.
Note that Balasubramanian and Ghadimi (2018) proves the convergence rate for classic zeroth-order
Frank-Wolfe algorithm. Our result is different in several aspects. First, we prove the convergence
rate of zeroth-order Frank-Wolfe with momentum. Second, we use symmetric finite difference
gradient estimator with two types of sensing vectors while they Balasubramanian and Ghadimi
(2018) use one-side finite difference gradient estimator with Gaussian sensing vectors. In terms of
query complexity, the total number of queries needed in Algorithm 2 is Tb = T 2d, which is linear
in the data dimension d. In fact, in the experiment part, we observe that this number can be
substantially smaller than d, e.g., b = 25.
5 Experiments
In this section, we present the experimental results for our proposed Frank-Wolfe attack framework
against other state-of-the-art adversarial attack algorithms in both white-box and black-box settings.
All of our experiments are conducted on Amazon AWS p3.2xlarge servers which come with Intel
Xeon E5 CPU and one NVIDIA Tesla V100 GPU (16G RAM). All experiments are implemented in
Tensorflow platform version 1.10.0 within Python 3.6.4.
5.1 Evaluation Setup
We compare the performance of all attack algorithms by evaluating on both MNIST (LeCun, 1998)
and ImageNet (Deng et al., 2009) datasets. For MNIST dataset, we attack a pre-trained 6-layer
CNN: 4 convolutional layers followed by 2 dense layers with max-pooling and Relu activations
applied after each convolutional layer. The pre-trained model achieves 99.3% accuracy on MNIST
test set. For ImageNet experiments, we attack a pre-trained Inception V3 model (Szegedy et al.,
2016). The pre-trained Inception V3 model is reported to have a 78.0% top-1 accuracy and a
93.9% top-5 accuracy. For MNIST dataset, we randomly choose 1000 images from its test set that
are verified to be correctly classified by the pre-trained model and also randomly choose a target
class for each image. Similarly, for ImageNet dataset, we randomly choose 250 images from its
validation set as our attack examples. For our proposed black-box attack, we test both options in
Algorithm 3. We performed grid search to tune the hyper-parameters for all algorithm to ensure
a fair comparison. Detailed description on hyperparameter tuning and parameter settings can be
found in the Appendix D.
5.2 Baseline Methods
We compare the proposed algorithms with several state-of-the-art baseline algorithms. Specifically,
we compare the proposed white-box attack algorithm with (i) FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2015) (ii)
PGD (Madry et al., 2018) (normalized steepest descent6) (iii) MI-FGSM (Dong et al., 2018). We
compare the proposed black-box attack algorithm with (i) NES-PGD attack (Ilyas et al., 2018a)
and (ii) Bandit attack (Ilyas et al., 2018b). We did not report the comparison with ZOO (Chen
6 standard PGD will need large step size to go anywhere since the gradient around the true example is relatively
small. On the other hand, the large step size will cause the algorithm go out of the constraint set quickly and basically
stop moving since then because of the projection step.
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et al., 2017c) here because it consistently underperforms NES-PGD and Bandit attacks according
to our experiments and prior work.
5.3 White-box Attack Experiments
In this subsection, we present the white-box attack experiments on both MNIST and ImageNet
datasets. We choose  = 0.3 for MNIST dataset and  = 0.05 for ImageNet dataset. For comparison,
we report the attack success rate, average number of iterations to complete the attack, as well as
average distortion for each method.
Tables 1 and 2 present our experimental results for the white-box attack experiments. For
experiments on both datasets, while FGSM only needs 1 gradient update per attack, it only achieves
21.5% attack success rate on MNIST and 1.2% attack success rate on ImageNet in the targeted
attack setting. All the other methods achieve 100% attack success rate. PGD needs in average 6.2
and 8.7 gradient iterations per attack on MNIST and ImageNet respectively. MI-FGSM improves
it to around 4.0 and 5.0 iterations per attack on MNIST and ImageNet. However, the distortion
of both PGD and MI-FGSM is very close to the perturbation limit , which indicates that their
generated adversarial examples are near or upon the boundary of the constraint set. On the other
hand, our proposed Frank-Wolfe white-box attack algorithm achieves not only the smallest average
number of iterations per attack, but also the smallest distortion among the baselines. This suggests
the advantage of Frank-Wolfe based projection-free algorithms for white-box attack.
Table 1: Comparison of targeted L∞ norm based white-box attacks on MNIST dataset with  = 0.3.
Methods ASR(%) # Iterations Distortion
FGSM 21.5 - 0.300
PGD 100.0 6.2 0.277
MI-FGSM 100.0 4.0 0.279
FW-white 100.0 3.3 0.256
Table 2: Comparison of targeted L∞ norm based white-box attacks on ImageNet dataset with
 = 0.05.
Methods ASR(%) # Iterations Distortion
FGSM 1.2 - 0.050
PGD 100.0 8.7 0.049
MI-FGSM 100.0 5.0 0.049
FW-white 100.0 4.8 0.019
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Table 3: Comparison of targeted L∞ norm based black-box attacks on MNIST and ImageNet
datasets in terms of attack success rate, average time and average number of queries (QUERIES:
for all images including both successfully and unsuccessfully attacked ones; QUERIES(SUCC): for
successfully attacked ones only) needed per image.
Methods
MNIST ( = 0.3) ImageNet ( = 0.05)
ASR(%) Time(s) Queries Queries(succ) ASR(%) Time(s) Queries Queries(succ)
NES-PGD 96.8 0.2 5349.0 3871.3 88.0 85.1 26302.8 23064.5
Bandit 86.1 4.8 8688.9 2019.7 72.0 148.7 27172.5 18295.2
FW (Sphere) 99.9 0.1 1132.6 1083.6 97.2 62.1 15424.0 14430.8
FW (Gaussian) 99.9 0.1 1144.4 1095.4 98.4 50.6 15099.4 14532.3
5.4 Black-box Attack Experiments
In this subsection, we present the black-box attack experiments on both MNIST and ImageNet
datasets. The maximum query limit is set to be 50, 000 per attack. We choose  = 0.3 for MNIST
dataset and  = 0.05 for ImageNet dataset. For comparison, we report the attack success rate,
average attack time, average number of queries needed, as well as average number of queries needed
on successfully attacked samples for each method.
Table 3 presents our experimental results for targeted black-box attacks on both ImageNet
and MNIST datasets. We can see that on MNIST, NES-PGD method achieves a relatively high
attack success rate, but still takes quite a lot queries per (successful) attack. Bandit method
improves the query complexity for successfully attacked samples but has lower attack success rate
in this setting and takes longer time to complete the attack. In sharp contrast, our proposed
Frank-Wolfe black-box attack algorithms (both sphere and Gaussian sensing vector options) achieve
the highest success rate in the targeted black-box attack setting while greatly improve the query
complexity by around 50% over the best baseline. On ImageNet, similar patterns can be observed:
our proposed Frank-Wolfe black-box attack algorithms achieve the highest attack success rate and
further significantly improve the query efficiency against the baselines. This suggests the advantage
of Frank-Wolfe based projection-free algorithms for black-box attack.
To provide more intuitive demonstrations, we also plot the attack success rate against the
number of queries for our black-box experiments. Figure 1 shows the plots of the attack success rate
against the number of queries for different algorithms on MNIST and ImageNet datasets respectively.
As we can see from the plots, Bandit attack achieves better query efficiency for easy-to-attack
examples (require less queries to attack) compared with NES-PGD or even FW at the early stages,
but falls behind even to NES-PGD on hard-to-attack examples (require more queries to attack).
We conjecture that in targeted attack setting, the gradient/data priors are not as accurate as
in untargeted attack case, which makes Bandit attack less effective especially on hard-to-attack
examples. On the other hand, our proposed Frank-Wolfe black-box attack algorithms achieve the
highest attack success rate and the best efficiency (least queries needed for achieving the same
success rate). This again confirm the advantage of Frank-Wolfe based projection-free algorithms for
black-box attack.
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Figure 1: Attack success rate against the number of queries plot for targeted black-box attacks on
MNIST and ImageNet datasets.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this work, we propose a Frank-Wolfe framework for efficient and effective adversarial attacks.
Our proposed white-box and black-box attack algorithms enjoy an O(1/
√
T ) rate of convergence,
and the query complexity of the proposed black-box attack algorithm is linear in data dimension
d. Finally, our empirical study on attacking both ImageNet dataset and MNIST dataset yield the
best distortion in white-box setting and highest attack success rate/query complexity in black-box
setting.
It would also be interesting to see the whether the performance of our Frank-Wolfe adversarial
framework can be further improved by incorporating the idea of gradient/data priors (Ilyas et al.,
2018b). We leave it as a future work.
A Derivation of LMO for General p ≥ 1
The derivation of LMO is as follows: denote h = (x− xori)/, we have
argmin
‖x−xori‖p≤
〈x,mt〉 = argmin
‖h‖p≤1
 · 〈h,mt〉
= argmax
‖h‖p≤1
 · 〈h,−mt〉.
By Ho¨lder’s inequality, the maximum value is reached when
|hi| = c · |(mt)i|
1
p−1 ,
where the subscript i denotes the i-th element in the vector and c is a universal constant. Together
with the constraint of ‖h‖p ≤ 1 we obtain
hi = −
sign
(
(mt)i
) · |(mt)i| 1p−1(∑d
i=1 |(mt)i|
p
p−1
) 1
p
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Therefore, we have
xi = − ·
sign
(
(mt)i
) · |(mt)i| 1p−1(∑d
i=1 |(mt)i|
p
p−1
) 1
p
+ (xori)i
Submit the above result back into LMO solution, for p = 2 case, we have
vt = −  ·mt‖mt‖2 + xori.
For p =∞ case, we have
vt = − · sign(mt) + xori.
B Proof of the Main Results
In the section, we provide the proofs of the technical lemmas and theorems in the main paper.
B.1 Proof of Lemma 4.3
Proof. By definition, we have
‖∇f(xt)−mt‖2 = ‖∇f(xt)− βmt−1 − (1− β)∇f(xt)‖2
= β · ‖∇f(xt)−mt−1‖2
= β · ‖∇f(xt)−∇f(xt−1) +∇f(xt−1)−mt−1‖2
≤ β · ‖∇f(xt)−∇f(xt−1)‖2 + β · ‖∇f(xt−1)−mt−1‖2
≤ βL · ‖xt − xt−1‖2 + β · ‖∇f(xt−1)−mt−1‖2, (B.1)
where the first inequality follows triangle inequality and the second inequality holds due to Assump-
tion 4.1. In addition, we have the following result:
‖xt − xt−1‖2 = γ‖dt−1‖2
= γ‖vt−1 − xt−1‖2
≤ γD. (B.2)
Substituting (B.2) into (B.1), and recursively applying the above inequality yields that
‖∇f(xt)−mt‖2 ≤ γ
(
βLD + β2LD + . . .+ βt‖∇f(x0)−m0‖2
)
= γ
(
βLD + β2LD + . . .+ βt−1LD
)
≤ γLD
1− β .
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B.2 Proof of Theorem 4.4
Proof. First by Assumption 4.1, we have
f(xt+1) ≤ f(xt) +∇f(xt)>(xt+1 − xt) + L
2
‖xt+1 − xt‖22
= f(xt) + γ∇f(xt)>(vt − xt) + Lγ
2
2
‖vt − xt‖22
≤ f(xt) + γ∇f(xt)>(vt − xt) + LD
2γ2
2
= f(xt) + γm
>
t (vt − xt) + γ(∇f(xt)−mt)>(vt − xt) +
LD2γ2
2
, (B.3)
where the last inequality uses the bounded domain condition in Assumption 4.2. Now define an
auxiliary quantity:
v̂t = argmin
v∈X
〈v,∇f(xt)〉.
According to the definition of g(xt), this immediately implies
g(xt) = −〈v̂t − xt,∇f(xt)〉. (B.4)
On the other hand, according to Line 5 in Algorithm 1, we have
vt = argmin
v∈X
〈v,mt〉,
which implies that
〈vt,mt〉 ≤ 〈v̂t,mt〉. (B.5)
Combining (B.3) and (B.5), we further have
f(xt+1) ≤ f(xt) + γm>t (v̂t − xt) + γ(∇f(xt)−mt)>(vt − xt) +
LD2γ2
2
= f(xt) + γ∇f(xt)>(v̂t − xt) + γ(∇f(xt)−mt)>(vt − v̂t) + LD
2γ2
2
= f(xt)− γg(xt) + γ(∇f(xt)−mt)>(vt − v̂t) + LD
2γ2
2
≤ f(xt)− γg(xt) + γD · ‖∇f(xt)−mt‖2 + LD
2γ2
2
, (B.6)
where the first equality is obtained by rearranging the second and the third term on the right hand
side of the first inequality, the second equality follows the definition of the Frank-Wolfe gap g(xt)
(B.4), and the last inequality holds due to Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. By Lemma 4.3, we have
‖∇f(xt)−mt‖2 ≤ γLD
1− β . (B.7)
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Substituting (B.7) into (B.6), we obtain
f(xt+1) ≤ f(xt)− γg(xt) + LD
2γ2
1− β +
LD2γ2
2
.
Telescoping over t = 0, . . . , T − 1 of the above inequality, we obtain
f(xT ) ≤ f(x0)−
T−1∑
t=0
γg(xt) +
TLD2γ2
1− β +
TLD2γ2
2
. (B.8)
Rearranging (B.8) yields
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
g(xt) ≤ f(x0)− f(xT )
Tγ
+ γ
(
LD2
1− β +
LD2
2
)
≤ f(x0)− f(x
∗)
Tγ
+ γ
(
LD2
1− β +
LD2
2
)
, (B.9)
where the second inequality is due to the optimality that f(xT ) ≥ f(x∗). (B.9) further implies
g˜T = min
1≤k≤T
g(xk) ≤ f(x0)− f(x
∗)
Tγ
+ γ
(
LD2
1− β +
LD2
2
)
.
Let γ =
√
2(f(x0)− f(x∗))/(CβLD2T ) where Cβ = (3− β)/(1− β), we have
g˜T ≤
√
2LD2Cβ(f(x0)− f(x∗))
T
.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 4.7
Proof. First, we have
E‖∇f(x)− q‖2 ≤ ‖∇f(x)− E[q]‖2 + E‖q− E[q]‖2
≤ ‖∇f(x)− E[q]‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
I1
+
√
E‖q− E[q]‖22︸ ︷︷ ︸
I2
, (B.10)
where the first inequality follows from triangle inequality, the second inequality holds due to Jensen’s
inequality. Let us denote ψi =
d
2δb
(
f(x+ δui)− f(x− δui)
)
ui. For term I1, we have
E[ψi] = Eu
[
d
2δb
(
f(x+ δui)− f(x− δui)
)
ui
]
= Eu
[
d
2δb
f(x+ δui)ui
]
+ Eu
[
d
2δb
f(x− δui)(−ui)
]
= Eu
[
d
δb
f(x+ δui)ui
]
=
1
b
∇fδ(x),
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where the third equality holds due to symmetric property of ui and the last equality follows from
Lemma C.1. Therefore, we have
E[q] = E
[ b∑
i=1
ψi
]
= ∇fδ(x).
This further implies that
‖∇f(x)− E[q]‖2 = ‖∇f(x)−∇fδ(x)‖2 ≤ δdL
2
, (B.11)
where the inequality follows from Lemma C.1.
For term I2, note that ψi’s are independent from each other due to the independence of ui, we
have
E‖q− E[q]‖22 = E
∥∥∥∥ b∑
i=1
[
ψi − Eψi
]∥∥∥∥2
2
=
b∑
i=1
E
∥∥ψi − Eψi∥∥2 ≤ b∑
i=1
E
∥∥ψi∥∥2. (B.12)
Note that for term E
∥∥ψi∥∥2, we have
E
∥∥ψi∥∥2 = Eu∥∥∥∥ d2δb(f(x+ δui)− f(x) + f(x)− f(x− δui))ui
∥∥∥∥2
2
≤ 1
2b2
Eu
∥∥∥∥dδ (f(x+ δui)− f(x))ui
∥∥∥∥2
2
+
1
2b2
Eu
∥∥∥∥dδ (f(x)− f(x− δui))ui
∥∥∥∥2
2
=
1
b2
Eu
∥∥∥∥dδ (f(x+ δui)− f(x))ui
∥∥∥∥2
2
≤ 1
b2
(
2d‖∇f(x)‖22 +
1
2
δ2L2d2
)
, (B.13)
where the first inequality is due to the fact that (a+ b)2 ≤ 2a2 + 2b2, the second equality follows
from the symmetric property of ui and the last inequality is by Lemma C.1. Also note that by
Assumption 4.1 and 4.6 we have
‖∇f(x)‖22 ≤ (‖∇f(0))‖2 + L‖x‖2)2 ≤ (G+ LD)2.
Therefore, (B.13) can be further written as
E
∥∥ψi∥∥2 ≤ 1
b2
(
2d(G+ LD)2 +
1
2
δ2L2d2
)
. (B.14)
Substituting (B.14) into (B.12) we have
E‖q− E[q]‖22 ≤
1
b
(
2d(G+ LD)2 +
1
2
δ2L2d2
)
. (B.15)
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Combining (B.10), (B.11) and (B.15) we obtain
E‖∇f(x)− q‖2 ≤ δLd
2
+
1
b
(
2d(G+ LD)2 +
1
2
δ2L2d2
)
≤ δLd
2
+
2
√
d(G+ LD) + δLd√
2b
.
B.4 Proof of Theorem 4.8
Proof. First by Assumption 4.1, we have
f(xt+1) ≤ f(xt) +∇f(xt)>(xt+1 − xt) + L
2
‖xt+1 − xt‖22
= f(xt) + γ∇f(xt)>(vt − xt) + Lγ
2
2
‖vt − xt‖22
≤ f(xt) + γ∇f(xt)>(vt − xt) + LD
2γ2
2
= f(xt) + γm
>
t (vt − xt) + γ(∇f(xt)−mt)>(vt − xt) +
LD2γ2
2
, (B.16)
where the second inequality uses the bounded domain condition in Assumption 4.2. Now define an
auxiliary quantity:
v̂t = argmin
v∈X
〈v,∇f(xt)〉.
According to the definition of g(xt), this immediately implies
g(xt) = −〈v̂t − xt,∇f(xt)〉. (B.17)
On the other hand, according to Line 5 in Algorithm 1, we have
vt = argmin
v∈X
〈v,mt〉,
which implies that
〈vt,mt〉 ≤ 〈v̂t,mt〉. (B.18)
Combining (B.16) and (B.18), we further have
f(xt+1) ≤ f(xt) + γm>t (v̂t − xt) + γ(∇f(xt)−mt)>(vt − xt) +
LD2γ2
2
= f(xt) + γ∇f(xt)>(v̂t − xt) + γ(∇f(xt)−mt)>(vt − v̂t) + LD
2γ2
2
= f(xt)− γg(xt) + γ(∇f(xt)−mt)>(vt − v̂t) + LD
2γ2
2
≤ f(xt)− γg(xt) + γD · ‖∇f(xt)−mt‖2 + LD
2γ2
2
, (B.19)
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where the first equality is obtained by rearranging the second and the third term on the right hand
side of the first inequality, the second equality follows the definition of the Frank-Wolfe gap g(xt)
(B.17), and the last inequality holds due to Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
Take expectations for both sides of (B.19), we have
E[f(xt+1)] ≤ E[f(xt)]− γE[g(xt)] + γD · E‖∇f(xt)−mt‖2 + LD
2γ2
2
≤ E[f(xt)]− γE[g(xt)] + γD ·
(
E‖qt −mt‖2 + ‖∇f(xt)− qt‖2
)
+
LD2γ2
2
≤ E[f(xt)]− γE[g(xt)] + γD
(
E‖qt −mt‖2 + δLd
2
+
2
√
d(G+ LD) + δLd√
2b
)
+
LD2γ2
2
,
(B.20)
where the second inequality follows from triangle inequality and the third inequality holds by Lemma
4.7. Similar to the proof of Lemma 4.3, we have
E‖qt −mt‖2 ≤ β · E‖qt − qt−1‖2 + β · E‖qt−1 −mt−1‖2
≤ β(E‖∇f(xt)− qt‖2 + E‖∇f(xt−1)− qt−1‖2 + E‖∇f(xt)−∇f(xt−1)‖2)+ β · E‖qt−1 −mt−1‖2
≤ β
(
δLd+
2
√
2d(G+ LD) +
√
2δLd√
b
+ L‖xt − xt−1‖2
)
+ β · E‖qt−1 −mt−1‖2
≤ β
(
δLd+
2
√
2d(G+ LD) +
√
2δLd√
b
+ γLD
)
+ β · E‖qt−1 −mt−1‖2, (B.21)
where the first and the second inequalities follow from triangle inequality, the third inequality follows
from Lemma 4.7, and the last inequality follows from (B.2). Recursively applying (B.21) yields that
E‖qt −mt‖2 ≤ 1
1− β
(
δLd+
2
√
2d(G+ LD) +
√
2δLd√
b
+ γLD
)
. (B.22)
Combining (B.20) and (B.22), we have
E[f(xt+1)] ≤ E[f(xt)]− γE[g(xt)] + LD
2γ2
2
+ γD ·
(
3− β
1− β
(
δLd
2
+
2
√
d(G+ LD) + δLd√
2b
)
+
γLD
1− β
)
.
(B.23)
Telescoping over t of (B.23), we obtain
E[f(xT )] ≤ f(x0)−
T−1∑
t=0
γE[g(xt)] +
TLD2γ2
2
+ γDT
(
3− β
1− β
(
δLd
2
+
2
√
d(G+ LD) + δLd√
2b
)
+
γLD
1− β
)
.
(B.24)
Rearranging (B.24) yields
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E[g(xt)] ≤ f(x0)− E[f(xT )]
Tγ
+D · 3− β
1− β
(
γLD +
δLd
2
+
2
√
d(G+ LD) + δLd√
2b
)
≤ f(x0)− f(x
∗)
Tγ
+D · 3− β
1− β
(
γLD +
δLd
2
+
2
√
d(G+ LD) + δLd√
2b
)
, (B.25)
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where the second inequality is due to the optimality that f(xT ) ≥ f(x∗). By the definition of g˜T in
Algorithm 2, we further have
E[g˜T ] ≤ f(x0)− f(x
∗)
Tγ
+D · 3− β
1− β
(
γLD +
δLd
2
+
2
√
d(G+ LD) + δLd√
2b
)
.
Let γ =
√
(f(x0)− f(x∗))/(CβLD2T ) where Cβ = (3− β)/(1− β), b = Td and δ =
√
1/(Td2), we
have
E[g˜T ] ≤ f(x0)− f(x
∗)
Tγ
+ CβLD
2γ + CβD
(
δLd
2
+
2
√
d(G+ LD) + δLd√
2b
)
≤ D√
T
(
2
√
CβL(f(x0)− f(x∗)) + Cβ(L+G+ LD)
)
.
C Auxiliary Lemma
Lemma C.1 (Lemma 4.1 in Gao et al. (2018)). Under Assumption 4.1, let fδ(x) = Eu[f(x+ δu)]
where u is sampled uniformly from the Euclidean unit sphere with with ‖u‖2 = 1, we have
∇fδ(x) = Eu
[
d
δ
f(x+ δu)u
]
,
‖∇f(x)−∇fδ(x)‖2 ≤ δdL
2
,
Eu
∥∥∥∥dδ (f(x+ δu)− f(x))u
∥∥∥∥2
2
=
(
2d‖∇f(x)‖22 +
1
2
δ2L2d2
)
,
where L is the smoothness parameter and d is the data dimension.
D Additional Experimental Details
D.1 Parameter Settings
As we mentioned in the main paper, we performed grid search to tune the hyper-parameters for
all algorithm to ensure a fair comparison. In detail, in white-box experiments, for Algorithm 1,
we tune the step size γt by searching the grid {0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9} on both datasets. For PGD and
MI-FGSM, we tune the learning rate by searching the grid {0.05, 0.10, . . . , 0.25, 0.30} on MNIST
and {0.01, 0.02, . . . , 0.4, 0.5] on ImageNet. For both FW and MI-FGSM, we tune the momentum
parameter β by searching the grid {0.1, 0.5, 0.9, 0.99}. In black-box experiments, for Algorithm 2, we
tune the step size γt by the grid {0.1/
√
t, 0.2/
√
t, . . . , 0.9/
√
t}, the momentum parameter β by the
grid {0.5, 0.9, 0.99, 0.999, 0.9999}, the sample size for gradient estimation b by the grid {5, 10, . . . , 50},
and the sampling parameter δ by the grid {0.1, 0.01, 0.001, 0.0001}. For NES-PGD and Bandit, we
tune the learning rate by the grid {0.01, 0.02, . . . , 0.10} on MNIST and {0.001, 0.005, 0.01, . . . , 0.02}
on ImageNet. For other parameters, we follow the recommended parameter setting in their original
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papers. We report the hyperparameters tuned by grid search in the sequel. In detail, for white-
box experiments, we list the hyper-parameters used for all algorithms in Table 4. For black-box
experiments, we list the hyper-parameters for Frank-Wolfe black-box attack algorithm in Table 5.
We also list the hyper-parameters used for NES-PGD and Bandit black-box attack algorithms in
Tables 6 and 7 respectively.
Table 4: Parameters used in targeted white-box experiments.
Parameters
MNIST ImageNet
PGD MI-FGSM FW PGD MI-FGSM FW
 0.3 0.05
γt 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.03 0.03 0.1
β - 0.9 0.9 - 0.9 0.9
Table 5: Parameters used in Frank-Wolfe black-box experiments.
Parameter MNIST ImageNet
{γt} 0.8/
√
t 0.8/
√
t
β 0.99 0.999
b 25 25
δ 0.01 0.01
Table 6: Parameters used in NES-PGD black-box experiments.
Parameter MNIST ImageNet
learning rate 0.02 0.005
number of finite difference estimations per step 25 25
finite difference probe 0.001 0.001
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